Sigintrep 01/2026. It is the name of one of the key documents about the human avalanche that collapsed Ceuta on July 30. It is a warning of vital importance, revealing “two interceptions of interest in Arabic and French” to Moroccan border agents who assured, on the 27th, that they were already considering “a possible massive entry into Ceuta.” Three days before it happened. It was recorded by the 32nd Electronic Warfare Regiment of the Army (REW 32), based in Seville. And surprisingly, it remained in the hands of the Army until the morning of the 30th, when it was received by the Chief of the Defense Staff (Jemad) and he informed the minister Margarita Robles.
The content of the two conversations in the possession of EL MUNDO is unequivocal and this is noted by REW 32 in point 2, relating to the “facts” described: “There are calls via social networks to enter massively on holidays, especially the night and day of the Throne Day celebration.” That is, on the eve, and Monday, July 30. It is prior information – clearly speaking of future events – that has not been included in the Government’s so-called “declassification” dossier, and which provides a key perspective: the Spanish Armed Forces knew, through conversations of Moroccan agents, that there was a plan to assault the border.
The intercepted agents from the neighboring country acknowledge having information from “the FAR” (Royal Armed Forces of Morocco). “They order that no one leaves their post” and add that “those off duty must also stay so that they are available if needed,” since “entry can occur both through the fence and by sea,” notes the Army based on the conversations heard.
In fact, those same agents assure that swimming entry is prohibited, and that, if necessary, the floatation devices of those attempting to swim into Ceuta should be punctured. This happens in real time, during their conversation. And there are arrests.
As soon as those two conversations about the “probability of massive entry into Ceuta” were obtained, REW 32 prepared the document accompanying these lines to “inform” their superiors, according to military Intelligence sources. That is, it was drafted out of urgency… which later did not materialize in the chain of command. Sources categorically state that the text is from July 27. And they add that from then until the 30th, this warning note was recorded and handled “within the Army.” But the military leadership did not receive it until the morning of the day of the avalanche. What happened that it took almost three days? And more importantly: who will assume responsibility? The chain of command was as follows: from the Army, to the deputy director and director of the Armed Forces Intelligence Center (CIFAS), and from there, to the Jemad.
EL MUNDO publishes today, due to its public interest and informative relevance, the image of the complete document, safeguarding the specific text of the intercepted conversations with the neighboring country’s agents. In total, there are five points, and until now only the fifth was known, where it is concluded that it is “very likely” that during July 30 “a massive entry of irregular migration will be attempted, taking advantage of the Throne Day holiday.”
This point was already advanced by this newspaper on September 2. It is the same that the Government has provided to the public in its dossier of warnings about the situation in Ceuta. But only the “cover” of the REW 32 submission to the Armed Forces Intelligence Center on the morning of the 30 is included. With the Army letterhead and the Spanish coat of arms, but only with point 5.
Sources acknowledge that this note “has been in the Army for two days,” and that “the raw interceptions are removed” before “passing to CIFAS.” The final document is, therefore, “edited” to become an alert when it is already too late.
The other four points support the final conclusion: “It is assessed as very likely that during July 30, 2026, a massive entry of irregular migration will be attempted, taking advantage of the Throne Day holiday in Morocco.”
Sources from La Moncloa acknowledge that they did not have access to the information in this note until the morning of July 30 itself, when it was already too late to act. In fact, this is reflected in the documents provided to the public this week.
It should be explained that the 32nd Transmissions Regiment is an Army unit responsible for “operating very specific transmission systems contributing to the joint action of the Armed Forces, in collaboration with the systems of other armies.” Its information was vital to anticipate July 30.
It should also be remembered that, despite the CNI warnings known this Wednesday, the Government did not deploy the Army in Ceuta until late afternoon that day. And until then, there were only nine civil guards deployed. At the moment thousands of people began crossing from Morocco, the Armed Institute had barely five agents on the ground at the border and four members of the Specialist Group in Underwater Activities (GEAS), the divers. Their chief joined them despite being on leave. The operation was completely overwhelmed. This unusual scenario pushed the 15 civil guards at the Ceuta Command to close the facilities to move to the border and reinforce the operation and try to contain the entry of immigrants.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the CNI warned in writing on July 29 the secret services (both external and internal) of Morocco about the massive entry the next day.
That is, Morocco knew and did nothing remotely sufficient.