The Estonian Foreign Minister, Marcus Tsahkna, is blunt. In an official note, he states: “Our assessment of the threats posed by Russia has not changed.” The implicit reference is easy to understand: the mission of the CIA director, John Ratcliffe, in Moscow has not altered the scenario.
The NATO country ambassadors, gathered yesterday in Brussels, also discussed this. The U.S. Undersecretary of Defense, Elbridge Colby, participated in the meeting. From what has emerged, it was an exchange marked by paradox. The Pentagon representative reassured the allies, assuring that the United States has no intention of leaving the Alliance. At the same time, however, he announced that before November 6, he will present to the Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, “at least four options” regarding the deployment of U.S. troops in Europe.
The forecast is that, as had already been anticipated, Washington will reduce the contingent, which currently consists of 80,000 military personnel.
All this while the alert within NATO remains high regarding the movements of Vladimir Putin. The most shared analysis is that the Kremlin will intensify hybrid warfare actions (or provocations). Sabotages, damage to telematic infrastructures or submarine cables, drone incursions, like those found loaded with explosives near Leipzig airport in Germany.
At the same time, however, it is now more difficult to rule out a real military attack, even if limited in scope. Contradictory signals come from Moscow. The Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, openly mentions “the military bases of the United Kingdom,” while Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s “voice,” rules out incursions against NATO countries.
But, who should we trust? That is the question several NATO ambassadors asked themselves again yesterday.
In recent months, several informal lists of possible targets have circulated, apparently prepared by the intelligence services of the United States and Germany. If we cross this information with studies from prestigious research centers, such as the Atlantic Council in Washington, and information gathered from diplomatic sources, some more vulnerable places can be identified.
The most exposed British base is Akrotiri, in Cyprus, which, incidentally, was already attacked by an Iranian drone last March. In theory, the naval detachment in Gibraltar or the detachment in Tapa, Estonia, would also be exposed. The British media are in full effervescence: for days they have been asking where Putin will attack. In Brussels, however, at NATO headquarters, an open offensive against a nuclear power like the United Kingdom tends to be ruled out.
The risk of escalation would be too high. There are, however, more secondary potential targets that would test the solidity and military response capacity of the Alliance. Among the most cited is the Estonian city of Narva, on the border with Russia, just 136 kilometers from Saint Petersburg. A significant part of Estonia’s Russian-speaking citizens live there.
Is a Putin incursion imaginable to protect the Russian minority, with the same motivations that were used for the Ukrainian Donbas? From Tallinn, the country’s capital, they informally say it would be a “stupid” idea, since that area is surrounded by rivers and other natural barriers, as well as having the presence of NATO troops.
Russian commandos could, as an alternative, cross Belarus and break Lithuania’s defenses to reach Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave overlooking the Baltic Sea.
At this time, Lithuania does not have enough tanks, combat aircraft, or ships to withstand the onslaught and would have to rely on NATO forces—German and American—deployed on the ground. Would they be enough? No one dares to say.
The island of Gotland, in Sweden, in the middle of the Baltic Sea, seems even more vulnerable; or the Finnish Åland archipelago, which has maintained its administrative autonomy and remains demilitarized even after Helsinki’s accession to NATO.
Finally, the Svalbard Islands are also pointed out, a Norwegian territory located in the far north, between the Barents Sea and the Greenland Sea. These are sparsely populated territories and, as established by a 1920 treaty, lack military defenses. 17% of the population is of Russian origin. A fact that could offer Putin the usual pretext to order another “special operation.”
