- How do you assess the management of the crisis unleashed in Ceuta by the Spanish Government?
- We still lack important information about what happened. That said, the Government’s initial reaction, publicly thanking Morocco for its cooperation, was not appropriate. I understand the logic. First, because at that moment it was key that the bulk of those who had crossed returned. And second, on a more macro level, I understand that preserving stability and a good relationship with Rabat is an important objective for Spain. But doing so before sufficiently clarifying what had happened reduced our room for maneuver. In the 2021 crisis, Pedro Sánchez reacted by immediately traveling to Ceuta, making it clear that Spanish sovereignty was not in question and that the State was willing to defend it. That combination of firmness and subsequent willingness to cooperate seemed more appropriate to me. Then there was a questionable management of that combination of ingredients when a clear accommodation to Rabat was made on the Sahara issue, without clear counterparts. Spain needs a good relationship with Morocco, but it must reconcile that objective with the need to preserve a security position.
- The Minister of Defense and the Interior Minister have exchanged reproaches over prior alerts to the massive entry of irregular immigrants. Did the National Intelligence Center (CNI) or the security forces in charge of controlling the border fail?
- I do not have information to determine where the failure occurred. But it would surprise me if a movement of this magnitude had gone completely unnoticed by the Spanish services. An operation like this leaves multiple signals: physical movements, communications, social networks, and other indicators that can be observed by different means. If they were not detected, one should ask why; and if they were detected, one should analyze how that information was processed and transmitted, and how it reached those who had to make decisions. Turning this into a dispute between ministries does not help. Internal divisions convey weakness outwardly, precisely when Spain needs to project cohesion and determination.
- But the fact is that the Executive, and we saw it again yesterday in Congress, not only shows differences about the role of the CNI; also about the nature of what happened on July 30. Margarita Robles openly talks about a “hybrid” attack. Other ministers reduce it to a migratory crisis. And the president, on his first visit to Ceuta, called it an “attack on territorial integrity.” What happened on July 30?
- There are too many unknowns about Morocco’s exact role to categorically use certain words. But, with the available indications, it seems reasonable to analyze what happened as a form of coercion or hybrid attack, and not simply as a migratory episode. Morocco is an authoritarian state, with a powerful security apparatus and significant border surveillance infrastructure. It is hard to imagine a movement of this size without the Moroccan authorities being aware of it and, at least, tolerating it. A different question is whether they participated directly in its planning or coordination. We do not have sufficient evidence to pronounce on that. But strategically, the context also matters. Morocco is going through a favorable moment: it has made substantial progress in the Sahara, maintains a privileged relationship with Washington, and perceives a relatively weakened Spanish position. It is reasonable to ask whether Ceuta has also served to test Spanish determination and the reaction of our allies. We are facing a national security and geopolitical crisis because it affects Spanish territorial integrity and one of the most important strategic spaces for the Peninsula: the Strait and our southern flank.
- That is to say, the Government’s shift towards recognizing Moroccan autonomy over the Sahara, far from calming Rabat, has emboldened it.
- It was a mistake, although one must recognize the difficult situation Spain was in. Morocco had managed to sway the US towards its positions and was making significant advances among European countries. Here I would highlight a basic rule of geopolitics: not only the balance of power matters; the balance of interests and determination also matters. The Sahara is much more strategically important for Spain and Morocco than for the vast majority of our allies. That is why this was one of those issues where Spain had reasons to stand firm.
- Returning to Ceuta. Should the Government have assumed unified command earlier?
- A crisis of this nature would have required some integrated coordination mechanism very early on, because it clearly exceeds the competencies of a single department: it has migratory, police, intelligence, diplomatic, and potentially military dimensions. Greater integration would have allowed better management and would have also fulfilled a second function: to convey calm to the population and determination outwardly.
- Can Spain make the control of its border with Morocco depend on a country that threatens Spanish territorial integrity?
- No. Spain must cooperate closely with Morocco in border management, but it cannot strategically depend on that cooperation. Even less so when members of the Moroccan Government have explicitly reiterated claims over Ceuta and Melilla, although Rabat has managed this issue with varying degrees of ambiguity. Cooperation is necessary; dependence is a vulnerability. Spain must have sufficient own capabilities and at the same time take care of diplomatic balances around this issue. International relations, more than good or bad, are power relations. A good relationship with Morocco will only be sustainable if it rests on a sufficiently solid Spanish position.
- Would a permanent militarization of the border be viable?
- The solution cannot be military, but there cannot be a credible strategy that ignores the military dimension either. Ceuta and Melilla present obvious defensive problems: distance, logistical vulnerability, and above all, the possibility that pressure takes hybrid forms deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military aggression. Spain needs something broader: escalation dominance. It must be able to respond to coercion in different areas, such as diplomatic and economic, so that any actor understands that increasing pressure on Ceuta or Melilla will have costs. Deterrence consists of convincing the other that coercion will not be profitable.
- You mentioned that, just a few days ago, two Moroccan ministers, one before Mohamed VI, called to “liberate” Ceuta and Melilla.
- It does not seem likely that Morocco will spontaneously abandon a claim that has shown remarkable continuity. From the Spanish point of view, however, the issue must be unequivocal: Ceuta and Melilla are Spanish. There are 130,000 compatriots there who deserve and demand protection. Their sovereignty is not subject to negotiation. Spain should work to reinforce that reality internationally, both in Europe and, above all, in the US. Washington has recently reiterated its recognition of Spanish sovereignty over both cities, and that is important. Spain needs a close relationship with Morocco. Geography does not allow otherwise. The formula should be deterrence, cooperation, and balance, in that order. But what happened must have consequences. There is a wide menu of diplomatic and economic responses: from calls for consultations and review of certain areas of cooperation to using our European influence, strengthening the relationship with Algeria, accelerating our defense capabilities, and urgently recomposing the relationship with the US. The deterioration of the relationship between Madrid and Washington, combined with the excellent relationship between Washington and Rabat, creates a permissive context that increases Morocco’s room for maneuver.
- To what extent does Morocco feel strengthened by the alliance with Israel and the US?
- It surely influences. The Abraham Accords have allowed Morocco to strengthen ties with Israel and have contributed to further improving its position in Washington. But I would not lose sight of the hierarchy. For Spain, the decisive factor in the diplomatic sphere is the US. The relationship with Israel matters, but because it is part of a broader transformation of Morocco’s international positioning. The problem for Spain arises if Rabat manages to become a more valuable partner for Washington while Spain’s relative value decreases.
- You have stated in EL MUNDO that Ceuta is part of the first line of defense of the Peninsula.
- Ceuta matters less for its size than for the system it is part of. Together with Melilla, the Canary Islands, and the Sahara space, it forms a perimeter that provides strategic depth to the Peninsula and helps protect the Strait. As that perimeter erodes, the importance and vulnerability of the remaining pieces increase. I would establish a very clear hierarchy. First are Spanish capabilities and determination. On the external level, the decisive interlocutor is Washington.
- That requires recomposing the link with Donald Trump.
- Spain can hardly preserve its interests in North Africa if the US adopts positions contrary to them. That is why recomposing the relationship with Washington and increasing Spain’s strategic value to the US should be a priority. The Strait, Rota and Morón, the air-naval projection between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, technological and industrial cooperation in defense are important assets, as is our link with Latin America. Spain starts from a structurally strong position vis-à-vis Morocco. The risk is allowing that advantage to erode. And there are two worrying factors: decades of insufficient investment in military capabilities and neglect of a relationship with the US that is fundamental for the strategic balance of the southern flank.
- Does the stability of the European southern flank require a close and cooperative relationship with Rabat?
- Without a doubt. Morocco is an extraordinarily important neighbor for Spain and there is a huge agenda of common interests: security, terrorism, economy, immigration, energy, and regional stability. But precisely because the relationship is so important, it must be built on solid foundations.
- Josep Borrell has called the EU’s reaction “hysterical.”
- I don’t know if I would use that term, but the reaction of many European partners has shown a worrying lack of solidarity with Spain. This crisis also demonstrates the deep differences that exist among Europeans on immigration. Spain cannot outsource to Brussels the defense of its strategic interests. What it can do is Europeanize much more the defense of Ceuta and Melilla at the political, economic, and migratory level. And here an important question arises: what European instruments can be mobilized when a third country uses its relationship with the Union as a lever of pressure on a member state.
- You are referring to economic or diplomatic reprisals.
- The menu is very broad. The EU has enormous commercial, financial, and regulatory power: market access, sectoral cooperation, agriculture, fishing, financing, visas, or political agreements can become instruments of pressure. We have precedents of using European economic power in response to acts of territorial coercion, although naturally they must be distinguished. The Russian annexation of Crimea affected a state that was not a member of the Union and led to successive rounds of sanctions. Here we are talking about a crisis that directly affects the territorial integrity of a member state. That should, in principle, strengthen Spain’s ability to mobilize European solidarity. The problem is that to activate those instruments, the nature of the crisis must first be correctly defined. If the Spanish Government itself avoids attributing any responsibility to Morocco and presents what happened mainly as a migratory and mafia issue, it considerably narrows the political space to later request European measures against Rabat. You cannot demand a European geopolitical response and, simultaneously, de-geopoliticize the cause that should justify it.
- Is the Government right to rectify and propose reforming the asylum procedure and the Aliens Law to toughen returns?
- In principle, yes. A state must be able to effectively control its borders and have legal mechanisms that allow returning those who do not meet the conditions to remain in its territory.
DNI
Born in Murcia, in 1981. He is director of the Real Instituto Elcano Office in Brussels and principal researcher.
Doctor in Political Science from the University of London, he is a professor of International Relations at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, in Brussels.
