Although the Army Intelligence detected on July 27 the “very likely” risk of a “massive entry” of immigrants in Ceuta on July 30, the final report with that key alert did not reach the Chief of the Defense Staff (Jemad), Teodoro Esteban López Calderón, until the morning of the same 30th. It was then that he “conferred” with the Minister of Defense, Margarita Robles, and she “coordinated” with Pedro Sánchez. But by then it was no longer possible to reverse the avalanche from the Spanish side, according to government sources.
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According to EL MUNDO exclusively, the Armed Forces Intelligence Center (CIFAS) sent the final report to the Jemad in an email at 10:06 on the day the avalanche of entries occurred – more than 70,000 people. Then, López Calderón informed Minister Robles, but the operation against Spain’s “territorial integrity” “had already begun, around 11:00” and there was no margin to plug the border, according to other sources familiar with the conversations of that day.
Did the Government no longer have time to react? At La Moncloa they assure that it did not: “The flow was allowed from 10:30 to 20:00, due to the collapse situation, with people already on the pier or in the water.” That is, to prevent more deaths.
This means that, for the Executive, the cause and culprit of Robles and Sánchez not having the alert in time would be the Armed Forces Intelligence Center. “Protocols must be reviewed and why reports are not escalated,” the sources point out.
If the fault was theirs, in the Government’s opinion, one wonders if there will be immediate dismissals because of it. It should also be remembered that, in addition to the report from the 27th revealed by this newspaper, on the 29th there was a meeting at the Government Delegation of Ceuta in which, according to Robles, intelligence agents “reported the call for the next day, precisely to be able to enter by swimming taking advantage of a holiday in the neighboring country.” It was enough to cross both pieces of information.
The question hovering over this whole case is the following: what happened for the Army to detect the risk of “massive entry” on a Monday, but the final report did not reach the Jemad – and therefore Robles and Sánchez, later – until Thursday?
On July 27, the 32nd Electronic Warfare Regiment (REW 32), based in Seville, warned the Armed Forces Intelligence Center that Moroccan border police agents had already detected the certain possibility of the migratory avalanche, and had ordered that no one leave their post on the Moroccan side of the border. The information from those agents was that a large entry in Ceuta could occur either on the night of the 29th or on July 30, “taking advantage of the Throne Day holiday in Morocco.”
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The CIFAS took very good note of this primary report, and sources from that Center assure that they included it in their final analysis, reinforced on the 29th. This document followed a chain of command: from the deputy director of CIFAS it went to the director – Antonio Romero Losada – and, already on July 30 at 10:06, it reached the Jemad.
Sources at La Moncloa assure this newspaper that the Executive did not receive the report from July 27. “Many agencies sent reports starting at 10:00 on the 30th, when things were already underway. The Government did not receive any extraordinary alert until the 30th.”
The last report from the National Immigration and Borders Center (CENIF), they exemplify, was sent at 13:56, in the middle of the avalanche. “Also, CENIF did not take its alerts out of the internal circuit. It decided not to escalate them.”
And why was the Army not activated earlier, which was not deployed until the late afternoon, around 20:00? Because “there was no operational need at that moment.” “The need was on the other side of the border.” That is, in Morocco. Which did nothing to contain the flow. On the contrary: according to CENIF, gendarmes and plainclothes agents helped in the avalanche with “active guidance.”
In fact, the alert on the 27th, prepared with information from Moroccan border police, implies that commanders of the neighboring country knew the plans but did not activate the border closure, as they did on August 15. That is: it is Morocco, therefore, that decides when yes and when no.
